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Abstract Are there different sizes of infinity? That is, are there infinite sets of
different sizes? This is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the
infinite. But it is of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results,
such as Cantor’s theorem, to the effect that there are infinite sets without bijections
(i.e. one-to-one correspondences) between them. These results (which I of course do
not dispute) settle the question, given an almost universally accepted principle
relating size to the existence of functions. The principle is: for any sets A and B, if A
is the same size as B, then there is a bijection from A to B. The aim of the paper,
however, is to argue that this question is in fact wide open: to argue that we are not
in a position to know the answer, because we are not in one to know the principle.
The aim, that is, is to argue that for all we know there is only one size of infinity.
1 Introduction
This paper is about a question that many readers will think has already been settled:
are there different sizes of infinity? That is, are there infinite sets of different sizes?
This is one of the most natural questions that one can ask about the infinite. But it is
of course generally taken to be settled by mathematical results, such as Cantor’s
theorem, to the effect that there are infinite sets without bijections between them.1
An answer to our question is entailed by these results (which I of course do not
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1 A bijection (or ‘one-to-one correspondence’) from A to B is a function that ‘pairs’ every member of A
with a distinct member of B, and vice versa. More precisely, let f be a function from A to B. f is an
injection from A to B if: for any x; y 2 A, if x 6¼ y, then f ðxÞ 6¼ f ðyÞ. f is a surjection from A to B if: for any
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dispute), given the following almost universally accepted principle relating size to
the existence of functions.
SIZE!FUNCTION
For any sets A and B, if A is the same size as B, then there is a bijection from
A to B.
For the results and the principle give us that there are infinite sets that are not of the
same size, from which it would seem to follow that there are such sets of different
sizes. The main aim of this paper, however, is to argue that this question is in fact
wide open: to argue that we are not in a position to know the answer, because we are
not in a position to know SIZE!FUNCTION. (By saying that we are not in a position to
know something, I mean just that we don’t know it, and there is no obvious way in
which to remedy this fact.) The aim, that is, is to argue that for all we know there is
only one size of infinity.
The standard modern account of size for sets consists of SIZE!FUNCTION and its
converse (together with related claims about when one set is smaller or larger than
another).
SIZE FUNCTION
For any sets A and B, A is the same size as B, if there is a bijection from A to B.
(I will also use SIZE$FUNCTION for the biconditional claim.) However, while this
converse has been the object of philosophical attention, SIZE!FUNCTION has been
surprisingly neglected. And this neglect is surprising, given that it is SIZE!FUNC-
TION, and not the converse, that is needed to derive that there are different sizes of
infinity—which, after all, might reasonably be described as the most important
claim of modern set theory. For example, in the opening pages of (1964), Go¨del
presents himself as arguing for the claim that A has the same number of members as
B iff there is a bijection from A to B (which would seem to be a relatively minor
variant of SIZE$FUNCTION). However, what he actually gives is essentially just an
argument for SIZE FUNCTION, leaving SIZE!FUNCTION to fend for itself. Indeed,
quite generally, arguments for SIZE!FUNCTION (or accounts of why we are entitled
to believe it) are astonishingly thin on the ground. For example, while in Michael
Hallett’s magisterial treatment of Cantor’s development of set theory we are told
that Cantor’s theory of cardinality is ‘inevitable’ (1984: xiv), the closest we get to an
argument for this claim uses SIZE$FUNCTION as an unsupported premise (1984: 88–
89). Similarly, although SIZE FUNCTION has been challenged (e.g. by Bolzano
(1851), Parker (2009) and Mancosu (2009)), there is no comparable history of
challenges to SIZE!FUNCTION.2
Footnote 1 continued
x 2 B, there is y 2 A with f ðyÞ ¼ x. f is then a bijection from A to B if it is both an injection and a
surjection from A to B.
2 If SIZE FUNCTION could in fact be shown to be false, for example, then that would give us a route to
knowledge of different sizes of infinity that would not go via SIZE!FUNCTION. I will take it, however, that
arguments such as that given by Go¨del do indeed show SIZE FUNCTION to be true, and thus that we are in
a position to know that there are different such sizes only if we are in one to know SIZE!FUNCTION.
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This lack of attention is even more surprising given how much discussion there
has in recent years been of Hume’s principle (which, again, would seem to be a
minor variant of SIZE$FUNCTION):3
8F8Gð#F ¼ #G$ F  GÞ:
Indeed, when in his seminal (1983) Crispin Wright comes to consider the question
of why we should in fact believe this, and, in particular, why we should believe the
left-to-right direction of it (i.e. SIZE!FUNCTION), what we are given is simply an
argument that he says works in the finite case. Why believe that it also holds in the
infinite one? ‘Good question’, he in effect says (1983: 107). But—actually—if the
arguments below are correct then that would seem about right. For although I will
focus on claims about size rather than number, it would seem to follow from these
that just as we are not in a position to know SIZE!FUNCTION, neither are we in one to
know (the left-to-right direction of) Hume’s principle.
1.1 Scepticism
Some readers, however, will already be sceptical. ‘Surely’—they will think—‘there
being a bijection from A to B is simply what it is for A to be the same size as B (and
so of course we are in a position to know SIZE!FUNCTION)’.4 Thus, on the most
straightforward way of understanding this, the suggestion is that ‘c is the same size
as d’ expresses the very same proposition as ‘there is a bijection from c to d’.5 But if
that is the case, then SIZE!FUNCTION would seem to be a proposition of the form
hfor any sets A and B, if p, then pi—which surely is something that are in a position
to know!6
On reflection, however, it just doesn’t seem plausible that there is anything like
such a strong connection between these sentences. For prima facie ‘c is the same
size as d’ expresses a proposition to the effect that there is a certain sort of
property—a size—that c and d have in common:
(1) h9!PðSizeðPÞ ^ c has PÞ ^ 9!QðSizeðQÞ ^ d has QÞ^9RðSizeðRÞ ^ c has
R ^ d has RÞi.
In contrast, ‘there is a bijection from c to d’ would seem to express a proposition
about a very different sort of thing—a function:
3 Here F and G range over Fregean concepts, #F means the number of Fs, and F  G means that there is
a bijection from the Fs to the Gs.
4 A closely related thought: what it is for A to be the same size as B is for it to be possible to ‘count’ their
members and arrive at the same result. However, everything that I will say can easily be adapted to this
alternative.
5 Less straightforward ways of understanding the remark, e.g. in terms of ‘reconceptualizing’ or
‘describing the same features of reality’, will be considered in Sect. 2 below.
6 I use angle brackets to refer to propositions. Unless otherwise stated, I for simplicity assume a
Russellian account of these. However, everything that I will say could be adapted to any alternative
account, such Fregean or possible worlds accounts: see, e.g., later in this subsection.
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(2) h9f f is a bijection from c to di.
If these sentences in fact express the same proposition, then presumably only one of
these appearances is correct, i.e. either both express (1) or both express (2).
Neither proposal seems promising, however. For surely most sentences about
functions express propositions that are genuinely about these. For example, consider
‘there is a constant function from c to d’. There does not seem to be any plausible
account of this on which it in fact expresses a proposition about properties. But it
beggars belief to think that such apparently similar sentences in fact express
propositions about completely different sorts of things. Thus it seems that ‘there is a
bijection from c to d’ cannot express (1). On the other hand, however, ‘c is the same
size as d’ is a sentence of the same general form as ‘e is the same colour as g’, ‘e is
the same height as g’, ‘e is the same sex as g’ etc. And it is surely very plausible that
these sentences also express propositions of the same general form. But it is clear
that the propositions that these other sentences express are not about functions. For
example, there does not seem to be any way of thinking of ‘e is the same colour as
g’ as in fact asserting the existence of a bijection. But then it seems that ‘c is the
same size as d’ cannot express (2). That is, it seems that the sentences do not
express the same proposition.
What if we instead identify propositions with sets of possible worlds? On this
account, ‘c is the same size as d’ and ‘there is a bijection from c to d’ express the
same proposition iff they are necessarily equivalent; which is presumably the case
iff SIZE$FUNCTION is true. In this case, there is no quick refutation of the claim that
they do in fact express the same proposition. By the same token, however, the fact
that they do express the same proposition—assuming for a moment that it is a fact—
would be of little help in providing an easy route to the claim that we know
SIZE!FUNCTION. For on this account of propositions, the fact that a and b express
the same proposition certainly does not mean that we are in a position to know
a! b (or generalizations of this); otherwise we would be in a position to decide
every pure mathematical claim c whatsoever (since we would be in a position to
know either 0 ¼ 0! c or 0 ¼ 0! :c, and hence either c or :c). An easy route to
knowledge of SIZE!FUNCTION—akin to that considered above in terms of Russellian
propositions—would within this framework thus require something quite different.
For example, such a route might be afforded by the claim that our two sentences
express the same propositions via the same ‘structured meanings’. But the
considerations given above would seem to show that the sentences do not have the
same meanings in this sense. And similarly, it would seem, for other attempts to find
an easy route to knowledge of SIZE!FUNCTION. On either conception of proposition,
then, this sort of scepticism about the project is misplaced.
1.2 Indeterminacy
The target of the paper is the claim that we are in a position to know
SIZE!FUNCTION. This would seem to require that the ordinary, intuitive notion of
size is sufficiently determinate to at least fix the truth-value of SIZE!FUNCTION. So
this is an assumption that I will make for most of the paper, at least for the sake of
B. Whittle
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argument. However, there is a very different way of thinking about these things that
some readers might be tempted by. According to this, while we do—in a sense—
know that there are different sizes of infinity, the ordinary notion of size is not in
fact so determinate. Thus we do not know SIZE!FUNCTION. What we do know,
however, is the next best thing, i.e. the following.
SIZE*!FUNCTION
There is some ‘size-like’ property size* such that:
for any sets A and B, if A is the same size* as B, then there is a bijection from
A to B.
That is, there is some property size* that is picked out by a notion that is at least
very similar to that of size (e.g. a sharpening of that notion), and that satisfies the
conditional in question. We would then be in a position to know that there are
different sizes of infinity at least in the sense of knowing that there are different such
‘sizes*’. For example, one version of this view might maintain that set theory
provides us with a ‘size-like’ property in this sense. Indeed, even if SIZE!FUNCTION
is determinately false, for example, one might think that knowledge of
SIZE*!FUNCTION would still in some important way vindicate the claim that we
know that there are different sizes of infinity. In fact, however, although the main
focus will be on SIZE!FUNCTION, the arguments that I will give against the claim
that we are in a position know this would seem to extend even to the weaker one that
we are in a position to know SIZE*!FUNCTION (see Sect. 9).7
Nevertheless, since I will for most of the paper assume that our ordinary notion of
size is sufficiently determinate to fix the truth-value of SIZE!FUNCTION, I should say
at least something to defend this claim; specifically, from what might seem to be the
main threat to it, which is as follows. Thus one might worry that the ordinary notion
of size is susceptible to paradox when we extend it to infinite sets, and that, as a
result, claims such as SIZE!FUNCTION lack a determinate truth-value. This worry
would be based on the fact that although (as I have noted) there seem to be strong
arguments for the converse principle SIZE FUNCTION, there also seem to be such
arguments against it: in particular, those stemming from the fact that it is
inconsistent with the ‘part-whole principle’, according to which a set is always
bigger than its proper subsets. The ordinary notion of size might thus—like the
ordinary notions of collection or truth—seem to be inconsistent, and so
unsuitable for serious theorizing. The latter, it would be argued, requires rather
some replacement, such as that offered by modern set theory.
This is not of course the place for a full discussion of this issue.8 I should
however note that there seem to be strong prima facie grounds for questioning this
line of thought—for there seem to be independent grounds to doubt the part-whole
principle. But, in that case, there is every reason to favour SIZE FUNCTION over this
principle, and so every reason to think that the ordinary notion is consistent (and
sufficiently determinate for our purposes). Thus, consider E, the set of even numbers
7 Readers who think that, even if we might be able to challenge SIZE!FUNCTION, SIZE*!FUNCTION is just
obvious are asked to bear with me until Sect. 4, where I will argue against such judgements.
8 For more extensive consideration of it, see Parker (2009) and Mancosu (2009).
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0, 2, 4, ..., and O, the set of odd ones 1, 3, 5, ... Even if we are uncertain about the
general claim SIZE FUNCTION, we are surely going to want to say that E and O are
the same size. However, the relationship that E stands in to O is precisely that which
O stands in to Eþ ¼ E  f0g. But then E and Eþ must be the same size too, in
which case the part-whole principle fails. There is, of course, more to be said here.
But these initial considerations do seem to go some way towards undermining what
might have seemed to be the strongest grounds for doubting our assumption (i.e.
about the determinacy of the ordinary notion of size); and thus some way towards
defending that assumption.
1.3 Interest
Why, though, should we care whether there are different sizes of infinity? The main
reason is simply that sizes are among the most natural and fundamental properties
that sets have. Thus, the question of whether there is one such property that applies
to every infinite set, or different ones that apply to different such sets, would seem to
be among the most natural that one can ask about sets or about infinity. Further, it is
clear that we do in fact care about this question. Why else would practically every
introduction to set theory in existence present the theory’s purported ability to
answer this as one of its main selling points—if not its main one?
1.4 Ontology
The focus of this paper is a principle about sets and functions. Alternative versions
of the principle would replace sets with Fregean concepts, properties or pluralities,
and everything that I will say would apply to such alternatives. I focus on the
principle about sets simply because these are most familiar, and least likely to lead
to distracting controversies.
I will not take a stand on what exactly functions are. For everything that I will say
would seem to be compatible with any reasonable account of this. For example, it
will be compatible with their being sets of ordered pairs, but equally with their being
sui generis objects, or some sort of ‘higher-order’ entity.
Similarly, I will not take a stand on the metaphysical status of either sets or
functions. Rather, what I say will be compatible with their existing in the same sort
of way that the objects of fundamental physics do, but also with their existing in
some much more ‘lightweight’ manner—or even not existing at all, as long as good
sense can be made of talk about them.
1.5 Structure
The main task of the paper, then, is to consider what seem to be the strongest
reasons for thinking that we know (or are in a position to know) SIZE!FUNCTION,
and to argue against them. In Sect. 1.1 I considered the suggestion that there being a
bijection from A to B is what it is for A to be the same size as B, understood as the
suggestion that ‘c is the same size as d’ and ‘there is a bijection from c to d’ in fact
B. Whittle
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express the same proposition. We saw that this cannot be right. But one might still
suspect that something close to it is. Specifically, one might suspect that the
properties that the former sentence is about are themselves to be understood in terms
of functions (so the sentence would indirectly be about functions). Further, as long
as we know such a functional account of size, we would be in a position to know
SIZE!FUNCTION. But in Sect. 2 we will see that such accounts are incorrect: sizes are
rather intrinsic properties of sets (i.e. properties that sets have purely in virtue of
what they are like, rather than which functions to or from the set there are). In Sect.
3 I will then consider the possibility of arguing for SIZE!FUNCTION on the basis that
it holds in the finite case. In Sect. 4 I will take a break from considering arguments
for SIZE!FUNCTION and consider SIZE*!FUNCTION. Specifically, I will argue against
the judgement that even if we might be able to challenge SIZE!FUNCTION,
SIZE*!FUNCTION is surely just obvious.
In Sect. 5 I will then consider what might seem to be the strongest argument for
SIZE!FUNCTION, which is as follows.9 Consider a simple pair of finite sets, such as
C ¼ f0; 1g and D ¼ f2; 3; 4g. Two things are true of these: (a) they are of different
sizes, and (b) there is no bijection between them. But these things also seem to be
connected: (a) seems to be the reason for—or the explanation of—(b). After all, if
we are asked, ‘Why is there no bijection between C and D?’, it is very natural to
answer, ‘Because they are of different sizes’ (or ‘Because C is smaller than D’). (In
contrast, if we are asked, ‘Why is C a different size to D?’, then it is not at all
natural to reply, ‘Because there is no bijection from C to D’.) But it is then tempting
to think that this must always be how things are. That is, that for any sets A and B, if
there is no bijection between them, then this fact must similarly have an
explanation, and further that the only one possible is in terms of size (i.e. the sets
differ in size). But then SIZE!FUNCTION must hold. Indeed, I would suggest that
some version of this argument is at least one of the reasons that we find
SIZE!FUNCTION so appealing. I will argue, however, that it fails. Specifically, I will
argue that in the paradigm cases of infinite sets that we know not to have bijections
between them, such as the set of natural numbers N and its powerset PðNÞ, there is
actually an alternative explanation of this fact that is available.10 This alternative
(straightforwardly inspired by a standard argument for Cantor’s theorem) replaces
talk of size with a principle to the effect that for any function f from N to PðNÞ,
there is a ‘diagonal’ set Df , whose construction guarantees that it must be outside
the range of f. This principle, I will argue, allows for a completely ‘sizeless’
explanation of the fact that there is no bijection from N to PðNÞ.
Thus, although the main concern of the paper is the epistemic status of
SIZE!FUNCTION (and hence of the claim that there are different sizes of infinity), we
will also arrive at some metaphysical results. In particular, a new picture of why
certain fundamental claims about sets and functions (e.g. claims to the effect that
there is no bijection between a given pair of sets) are true. This will show that a
range of thoughts that might initially seem obvious must in fact be given up.
9 The discussion of this section is a significantly expanded version of that of Whittle (2015: 11–15).
10 If A is a set, then its powerset, PðAÞ, is the set of its subsets.
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In Sect. 6 I will then consider the finite case of SIZE!FUNCTION. I will point out
that while there is a strong argument for this, it will not extend to the general case.
Having seen that the apparently most promising strategies for arguing for
SIZE!FUNCTION fail, I will in Sect. 7 consider the possibility that this principle is
in fact sufficiently obvious that we are entitled to treat it as basic, i.e. believe it even
in the absence of such an argument. The reason for waiting so long before
considering this idea is just that the considerations of preceding sections will be
helpful in making clear that SIZE!FUNCTION is not obvious. In Sect. 8 I will consider
the possibility of giving an inductive argument for the principle, i.e. an argument
based on the virtues of the mathematical or philosophical results that it lets us derive.
In Sect. 9 I will then come back to SIZE*!FUNCTION, explaining how the arguments
of the preceding sections would seem to extend even to the weaker claim that we are
in a position to know this. In conclusion I will consider some directions for future
work.
2 Functional Accounts of Size
In this section, then, I will consider accounts of size in terms of functions. Such an
account would seem to be next best thing to ‘c is the same size as d’ expressing h9f f
is a bijection from c to di. For on such an account the proposition expressed by this
sentence would at least indirectly be about functions.
On the prima facie most promising such account, sizes would be properties of the
following form:11
hthere is a bijection from _ to ji,
where j is a set of some privileged sort, such as a cardinal (as defined in standard set
theory). If these are what sizes are, then ‘c is the same size as d’ would express
something close to the proposition that there is a cardinal that c and d both have
bijections to, which is in turn close to that to the effect that there is a bijection from
c to d. Further, such an account will straightforwardly entail SIZE!FUNCTION, and so
if we know the account we would be in a position to know the principle. It seems,
however, that no such account can be correct.
The most straightforward way in which to see this is as follows. Consider the sets
f0; 1g and f2; 3g, and a situation that is just like the actual world, except that there
are no functions from either set. What would be true in this situation? It is, perhaps,
metaphysically impossible. But, as we will see, we seem to be quite capable of
judging what would be true in it (at least in the cases that I will be concerned with).
And, after all, we consider metaphysically impossible situations in both philosophy
and mathematics all the time. For example, it is plausibly either metaphysically
impossible that there are sets, or metaphysically impossible that there are not. But
we seem to have no difficulty in considering each hypothesis, and judging would be
11 I assume that logically complex properties are Russellian propositions with ‘gaps’ or ‘variables’ in
them, and so I refer to these too with angle brackets. As with propositions, however, it would seem
possible to adapt anything that I will say to any alternative account.
B. Whittle
123
true under it. Similarly, in mathematics, when we prove by reductio that there is no
surjection from N to PðNÞ, we consider the metaphysically impossible hypothesis
that there is such a function. And we have no difficulty at all in discerning what is,
and what is not, an immediate consequence of this hypothesis. (Further, although
the argument to follow is in terms of what is true under a metaphysically impossible
hypothesis, one could, if one wanted to tighten the connection to standard reductio
arguments, give a similar argument in terms of what is an immediate consequence
of this hypothesis.) There should be little concern, then, about the legitimacy of this
use of a metaphysically impossible hypothesis.
What would be true in the situation that I described?One thing that would clearly be
true is that there would be no bijection from either f0; 1g or f2; 3g. Thus, neither set
would have a property of the form hthere is a bijection from _ to ji (for j a cardinal or
anything else). On the other hand, it seems equally clear that the sets would still be of
the same size. We surely wouldn’t describe this as a situation in which f0; 1g is no
longer the same size as f2; 3g. But then the above account of size (in terms of bijections
and cardinals) must be wrong: for if it was right, this would be a situation in which
neither set has a size at all (since neither has a property of the form in question), and so
they could not have the same one.
Further, a similar argument would seem to be available to show that any
alternative functional account must also fail. Indeed, arguments along these lines
would seem to show that any account of the size of a set in terms of things that are
extrinsic to that set must similarly fail. (By saying that something is extrinsic to a set,
I mean that it is not one of the things that constitute that set, such as its members, their
parts or their members.) That is, sizes seem to be intrinsic properties of sets.
2.1 ‘What It Is’
In Sect. 1.1 I considered the idea that there being a bijection fromA toB is what it is for
A to be the same size as B, understanding this as requiring that ‘c is the same size as d’
and ‘there is a bijection from c to d’ express the very same proposition. As I noted,
however, alternative understandings would also seem to be available. For example, an
understanding on which the proposition expressed by the sentence about size (i.e. (1))
is a ‘reconceptualization’ of that expressed by the sentence about bijections (i.e. (2)),
or on which the two propositions ‘describe the same feature of reality’.12 However,
these alternatives would also seem to be refuted by the thought experiment just
considered . For if (1) is a reconceptualization of—i.e. just anotherway of saying—(2),
then given that (2) is false in the situation described, (1) should be false too. But we
have seen that (1) is in fact true in this situation. Similarly, if the two propositions
describe the very same feature of reality, then, given that (2) is false in the situation,
one would again expect (1) to be too. It seems, therefore, that these alternative
understandings are incorrect, just as the more straightforward one is.13
12 For this notion of reconceptualization, see Wright (1997), for that of describing the same feature of
reality, see Rayo (2013).
13 Am I dismissing the whole neo-Fregean tradition (i.e. that begun by Wright (1983)) on the basis of the
above thought experiment? Certainly not. The thought experiment does seem to show that claims
involving the ordinary notion of number—just like those involving the ordinary notion of size—are far
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2.2 Conceptions of Function
One might worry that this is a point where our conception of function makes a
difference. For suppose that we think of these as Fregean concepts, for example.
Then a situation in which there is no bijection from f0; 1g to f2; 3g will not just be
metaphysically impossible, but logically so (at least arguably). Even if we can make
sense of metaphysically impossible situations, can we really make sense of logically
impossible ones? In fact, however, when it comes to this branch of logic (and so this
type of logical impossibility) we seem to have no difficulty at all. For just as we can
make sense both of the hypothesis that there are sets, and also the hypothesis that
there are not, so we can make sense both of the hypothesis that there are Fregean
concepts, and also that to the effect that there are not. Similarly, we have no
difficulty at all reasoning on the basis of the hypothesis that there is a Fregean
concept that is a surjection from N to PðNÞ (e.g. in the course of proving that there
is no such concept). It seems, then, that the argument above succeeds even if we
think of functions in such a ‘higher-order’ way.14
2.3 A Further Problem
What I have said would seem to be quite sufficient to see off functional accounts of
size. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that there is a further problem that the
specific account considered above (i.e. that in terms of bijections and cardinals)
suffers from. This is a version of the ‘Benacerraf problem’ (see (1965)), which
afflicts identifications of the natural numbers with sets (e.g. £; f£g; ff£gg. . . or
£; f£g; f£; f£gg. . .). The original problem is simply that any such identification
would seem arbitrary, and thus incorrect. But the account of size in terms of
cardinals would seem to face a similar problem. For the way in which cardinals are
defined is as follows. One first defines ordinals (i.e.£; f£g; f£; f£gg and so on),
and then cardinals as distinguished ones of these. But there are other families of sets
Footnote 13 continued
from reconceptualizations of claims about bijections. However, this seems quite compatible with the main
claims of the neo-Fregean tradition (for which see, e.g., the introduction of Hale and Wright (2001)).
These central claims require only that knowledge of the existence of abstract objects can be grounded in
analytic ‘abstraction principles’, such as Hume’s principle. They do not require that these principles are
analytic of our ordinary notions. After all, Frege’s original programme, quite apart from the trouble with
Basic Law V, would seem untenable as an account of the ordinary notion of number, for example. Since
Frege identified numbers with sets (or extensions). But the considerations of Benacerraf (1965) would
seem to show that, when understood in terms of the ordinary notion, no such identification is correct (see
Sect. 2.3 below). Of course, the neo-Fregean will want claims about their notion of number to be
necessarily equivalent to claims about the ordinary notion—something that the conclusion of this paper
would seem to challenge, at least in the sense of challenging our claim to know this. But this conclusion is
certainly not based on the above thought experiment alone.
14 There is a terminological point that I should flag, however. I have been assuming that if sizes are
intrinsic, then they do not involve functions. But one might insist that an intrinsic property is simply one
that applies to an object independently of its relations to other objects, in which case sizes could be
intrinsic while still involving functions, as long as these are taken to be Fregean concepts. Nothing for
these purposes turns on this point, however. If this is the right way to use ‘intrinsic’, then my claims must
just be reformulated using a stronger notion, that rules out dependence on functions, however these are
understood.
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that one could apparently just as well characterize sizes in terms of. For example,
rather than thinking of ordinals as sets in this way one could instead think of them
essentially as we do natural numbers, i.e. as a sui generis family of objects without
anything like members. Call such an object an ordinal*. One could then easily
define a notion of cardinal in terms of these: for any ordinal* k, let k* be the set of
ordinals that come before k; a cardinal* would then be an ordinal* j such that for
no earlier k is there a bijection from k* to j*. A characterization of size in terms of
cardinal*s would then seem just as apt as that in terms of cardinals: i.e. sizes would
be properties of the form hthere is a bijection from _ to j*i for some cardinal* j.
Thus—just as with natural numbers and sets—the identification of sizes with either
of these families of properties would seem arbitrary, and thus incorrect.
The upshot of this section is that functional accounts of size are untenable. We
should be clear, however, that it certainly does not yet follow that there is anything
wrong with using functional properties to investigate size (since sizes may still be
coextensive with such properties). For example, it certainly does not yet follow that
there is anything wrong with the standard mathematical definition of cardinality—as
long as this is not taken to be an account of what sizes are. This definition will be
useful in connection with investigating size, as long as SIZE!FUNCTION is true
(something that we are of course yet to rule out). What does follow from the above
arguments is simply that—contrary to what we might have hoped—we cannot
establish that this principle is in fact true via a functional account of size.15
3 Arguing from the Finite Case
Without question, the finite case of SIZE!FUNCTION is true. I will consider how we
know this in Sect. 6. But what about arguing for the general case just on the basis of
this special one? The problem is that many things true of finite sets are not true
generally. For example: if A  B then A is smaller than B; there is no injection from
A into a proper subset of A; if A is a set of natural numbers, then there is some
Turing machine that outputs precisely the members of A. But then the fact that
something is true of finite sets is at best very weak evidence for its holding
generally. Thus it seems that we cannot argue for the general case of the principle
just on the basis of the finite one.
15 Rather than giving such a functional account of size, i.e. of the properties, one might instead give such
an account of the notion, or concept, of size. For example, one might propose that this concept is: is a
property that applies exactly to the members of some bijection-type (or perhaps: is the most natural such
property). Again, however, the thought experiment we considered would seem to refute such accounts.
For in the situation described there is no bijection between f0; 1g and f2; 3g, and so they do not share a
bijection-type. Thus, they do not share a property applying exactly to the members of such a type. So on
the proposal under consideration, ‘f0; 1g is the same size as f2; 3g’ would be false in this situation.
However, as we have in effect noted, this is in fact true in the situation. Alternative such accounts are
possible, of course, but they seem to be defeated by similar arguments.
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4 ‘Size-Like’ Properties
Suppose that, as I am in the process of arguing, we are not in fact in a position to
know SIZE!FUNCTION. Nevertheless, one might still think that our claim to
knowledge of different sizes of infinity would be vindicated—at least in some
important sense—if we are in a position to know that there is some ‘size-like’
property that satisfies this principle. That is, that there is some property that is very
similar to size that satisfies it. (Recall that I use SIZE*!FUNCTION for this claim.)
Indeed, I imagine that many readers, at least at the outset, will have thought that
even if it might be possible to challenge SIZE!FUNCTION, SIZE*!FUNCTION is surely
just obvious. In fact, however, what we have seen should already make us doubt this
judgement.
For why think that SIZE*!FUNCTION is obvious? The reason is presumably
something like this: in modern set theory we study a family of properties that satisfy
SIZE!FUNCTION, i.e. powers or what are usually called ‘cardinalities’, which are
properties of the form hthere is a bijection from _ to ji (for a cardinal j). Surely—
one might have thought—even if these are not in fact sizes, they are at least very
similar to them. But then SIZE*!FUNCTION is true. One way of putting such a
thought would be to say that the property of being a power is at least one natural
generalization of that of being a finite size. However, plausible as such thoughts
might initially have appeared, they seem just to be mistaken. For, firstly, the
property of being a power isn’t a generalization of that of a finite size: since the
collection of powers doesn’t include the finite sizes (as we saw in Sect. 2). Further,
powers are just a completely different sort of property from sizes. For, unlike
powers, sizes are intrinsic and do not have anything particularly to do with functions
or cardinals. It is true, of course, that every finite size is coextensive with a power,
but that certainly doesn’t show that there is any real similarity between the two.
Consider an analogy: suppose that for some set M of masses, there is a measuring
device d (e.g. an electronic scale) such that for any objects x and y whose masses are
in M, x has the same mass as y iff x produces the same reading as y when placed on
d. It would certainly be a mistake to conclude from this that there is any real
similarity between masses and properties of the form h_ produces reading r on di—
precisely because masses do not have anything particularly to do with measuring
devices or readings on them. But the situation with sizes and powers seems in all
essential respects to be the same: that is, it seems similarly to be the case that there
is no real similarity between sizes and powers precisely because the former do not
have anything particularly to do with functions or cardinals.16 It seems, then, that we
should question those initially plausible judgements to the effect that SIZE*!FUNC-
TION is just obvious.
16 If one is troubled by the fact that masses in M will only be contingently coextensive with properties
about readings on d then just consider rigidified versions of these. That is, properties of having a certain
mass in the actual world vs properties of producing a certain reading on d in this world. These will be
necessarily coextensive (given our hypothesis). But it is surely just as clear that there is no real similarity
between these two sorts of properties.
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5 An Explanatory Connection?
We now come to what might seem the prima facie most compelling argument for
SIZE!FUNCTION.
5.1 The Argument
Thus, consider a simple pair of finite sets, such as C ¼ f0; 1g and D ¼ f2; 3; 4g.
Two things are true of these: (a) they are of different size; and (b) there is no
bijection from C to D. But these things also seem to be connected: (a) seems to be
the reason for—or the explanation of—(b). For if we are asked, ‘Why is there no
bijection from C to D?’, it is very natural to answer, ‘Because C is a different size
from D’ (or ‘Because C is smaller than D’). In contrast, if we are asked, ‘Why is C a
different size to D?’, then it is certainly not natural to reply, ‘Because there is no
bijection from C to D’. Rather, one would say something about the members of
C and D, such as ‘Because the only members of C are 0 and 1, whereas D contains
2, 3 and 4 (all of which are distinct)’.
The explanation of why there is no bijection from C to D thus seems to be as
follows, where an arrow from one fact to another means that the latter holds because
the former does. (Call this explanation (E1).)
There is no bijection fromC toD
"
C is a different size toD
"
membership facts aboutC andD
But it is then tempting to think that this must always be how things are. That is, that
for any sets A and B, if there is no bijection from A to B, then there must similarly be
some explanation of this fact, and further that the only one possible is that A is a
different size to B. But then of course SIZE!FUNCTION must hold.17
How plausible this line of thought can seem can be made even clearer by
considering other, closely related ones. Consider the following principle, for
example.
(3) For any set A, if A does not have an ordering isomorphic to hN;\i, then A is
a different size to N.
This no doubt seems very plausible to many readers. And it is tempting to argue for
it as follows: suppose that A does not have an ordering isomorphic to hN;\i; this
must surely be explained by something about A; but the only thing relevant would
seem to be A’s size, i.e. A must have either too few, or too many, members for them
to be ordered in this way; but then (3) must hold.
17 Note that the suggestion is not that we need SIZE!FUNCTION to explain the non-existence of a bijection
on the basis of a difference in size. It is rather that the universal existence of such explanations would
itself ensure the truth of this principle.
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Indeed, given how plausible these lines of thought can seem to us, it is surely
likely that they are at least among the reasons that we find principles such as
SIZE!FUNCTION and (3) so appealing.
5.2 An Alternative Explanation
They seem to be mistaken, however. For in the paradigm cases of infinite sets that
we know not to have bijections between them, there are in fact alternative
explanations that are available. To illustrate, considerN and PðNÞ, and consider the
following principle.
DIAGONAL
For any f : N! PðNÞ, there is Df 2 PðNÞ such that
Df ¼ fn 2 N : n 62 f ðnÞg.
This is of course familiar. But it seems to enable a sizeless explanation of the fact
that there is no bijection from N to PðNÞ, as follows. Let f : N! PðNÞ, and
consider Df as in DIAGONAL. This must be distinct from f(0): since by the definition
of Df , 0 2 Df iff 0 62 f ð0Þ. But for the same sort of reason it must be distinct from
f(1), f(2) and so on. So f cannot be a bijection. The gist of this explanation is simply
this: given any way f of assigning sets of numbers to numbers, there is a
corresponding way Df of forming a set of numbers; and the relationship of this set to
the assignment guarantees that it will be distinct from every set involved in that
assignment.
Again, this sort of reasoning is of course familiar (it corresponds to a standard
proof of Cantor’s theorem). But the point that I want to make here is that it seems to
amount to an alternative, sizeless explanation of the fact that there is no bijection
fromN to PðNÞ. For if we are asked, ‘Why is there is no such bijection?’, then what
I have just given would seem to constitute a completely satisfying answer. —A
retort of ‘I still don’t understand why there is no such function’ would seem totally
out of place. Thus, we seem to have an explanation of why there is no such function
that is quite different from (E1), i.e. as follows. (Call this (E2).)
There is no bijection from N to PðNÞ
"
Diagonal
"
membership facts about N and PðNÞ
But if that is right then the proposed argument for SIZE!FUNCTION fails (since that
required that whenever there is no bijection from A to B, the only possible expla-
nation is that A is a different size to B).
Perhaps, however, there will be resistance to the idea that (E2) is a genuine
explanation. If so, then this might be because (E2) can—at first glance!—appear
uncomfortably similar to the following ‘alternative explanation’ in the original case
of C and D. (Call this (E3).)
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There is no bijection from C to D
"
for any f : C ! D; there is x 2 D such that for all y 2 C; f ðyÞ 6¼ x
"
membership facts about C and D
But it seems absurd to suggest that this is a genuine explanation of why there is no
bijection from C to D—and so one might worry that it is similarly absurd to claim
that (E2) is a genuine explanation.
The similarity between (E2) and (E3) is merely superficial, however. For (E3) is
certainly not an adequate answer to ‘Why is there no bijection from C to D?’ Rather,
it just invites the follow-up ‘But why does the middle fact hold?’ (i.e. why is it that
for every f : C ! D there is some member of D that is outside the range of f?). And
the only way of answering this would seem to be by saying something about size,
i.e. ‘Because C is smaller than D’.
In contrast, (E2) does, as I have noted, seem to be an adequate answer to ‘Why is
there no bijection from N to PðNÞ?’ It doesn’t, that is, just invite a comparable
follow-up. Further, although we certainly could say more about why the middle fact
of (E2) holds, the natural way of doing this, unlike in the case of (E3), would make
no mention of size. Rather, it would invoke the following.
(4) For any property P, there is a set A ¼ fn 2 N : n has Pg.
(5) PðNÞ contains every set of numbers.
For these seem to enable a satisfying answer to ‘Why does DIAGONAL hold?’ (Since,
for any f : N! PðNÞ, there will be a property that applies precisely to those
numbers that do not belong to their image under f.) Could one insist that one of (4)
and (5) holds because of something about the sizes of N and PðNÞ? It doesn’t seem
so: (5) is simply a statement of what PðNÞ is; and (4) is close to a basic fact about
sets; insofar as one can give an explanation of it at all, this will amount to showing
how it follows from our basic conception of set (i.e. the iterative conception), but
such an explanation would make no mention of size. Thus, the similarity between
(E2) and (E3) seems merely to be superficial, and so (E2) appears to be a genuine
explanation.
Although the main concern of the paper is the epistemic status of SIZE!FUNCTION
(and thus of the claim that there are different sizes of infinity), we have arrived at
some metaphysical conclusions. Specifically, a picture of why certain fundamental
claims about sets and functions are true. The initial strokes of this are as follows. In
the case of simple pairs of finite sets, such as C and D, if these do not have bijections
between them, then the only possible explanation would indeed seem to be that they
differ in size. In the case of certain infinite sets, however, such asN and PðNÞ, there
is a quite different sort of explanation (i.e. (E2)). This replaces talk of size with a
principle to the effect that for any function from N to PðNÞ, there is a certain
member of PðNÞ that stands in a certain relation to it. Are these claims quite as
exciting as those to the effect that there are different sizes of infinity? Perhaps not.
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But how revisionary—and surprising—they are can be seen by putting things in
terms of counting.
Thus, it might seem obvious that if A and B are sets whose members one cannot
count and arrive at the same result, then the only possible explanation is that they
differ in size. (Compare: if s and t are sticks whose length one cannot measure and
arrive at the same result, then the only possible explanation is that they differ in
length.) But if the picture that I am sketching is right, then this apparently obvious
claim is quite mistaken. For just as we can give a sizeless explanation of the fact that
there is no bijection from N to PðNÞ, so we can give one of the fact that we cannot
count these sets and arrive at the same result, i.e. there is no cardinal that each set
has a bijection to. (This explanation will be essentially similar to (E2).)
As I noted in Sect. 5.1, it can also seem obvious that if a set does not have an
ordering isomorphic to hN;\i, then the only possible explanation is that it is a
different size to N. But it seems that this too must be wrong: for in the case of
PðNÞ, for example, we can give a quite different explanation. (Again, essentially
similar to (E2).)
Now, the existence of these alternative explanations is presumably compatible
with the sets in question also differing in size, i.e. with there also being explanations
in terms of size (and thus with SIZE!FUNCTION being true). But the contention of the
paper as a whole is that we do not in fact have any reason to think that there are such
additional explanations.
I should note that there is a certain respect in which things are a bit more nuanced
than the above lets on. For everything that I have said about N and PðNÞ of course
applies mutatis mutandis to any pair of sets of the form A and PðAÞ—including the
case where A is finite. That is, it is not just with certain infinite sets that the fact that
there is no bijection can be explained without appealing to size. Rather, this is also
true of certain finite ones. But this might set off alarm bells: does this mean that I am
committed to denying that we know even the finite case of SIZE!FUNCTION? There is
no need to worry, however. For while I am committed to denying that the argument
of Sect. 5.1 works even in the (full) finite case, it certainly doesn’t follow from this
that we do not know this case. For, as I will explain in Sect. 6, we can give a quite
different argument for it (it is just that it will not extend to the general case).
5.3 Simple Pairs of Finite Sets
First, however, I want to say something more about simple pairs of finite sets such
as C and D. That is, pairs of sets without a bijection between them, but where this
cannot be explained ‘sizelessly’ along the lines of (E2). For one might worry that I
have conceded too much to the argument of Sect. 5.1 with respect to these.
Specifically, I went along with the contention that, at least in the case of C and D,
the only possible explanation is indeed in terms of size. But one might worry that
there is in fact even in this case a sizeless alternative (and thus that my
characterization of the contrast between this case and that of N and PðNÞ, for
example, is mistaken).
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For it might be suggested that the following is an alternative explanation in the
case of C and D: given the facts about which members C and D have, it follows that
the only functions from C to D are f0! 2; 1! 2g; f0! 2; 1! 3g; . . .;
f0! 4; 1! 4g; but none of these are bijections; thus, there isn’t a bijection from
C to D. The idea, that is, is that the following is an alternative to (E1). (Call this
(E4).)
There is no bijection from C to D
"
the functions from C to D are: f0! 2; 1! 2g; . . .; f0! 4; 1! 4g
"
membership facts about C and D
However, as with (E3), there would seem to be a clear sense in which this is not
an adequate answer to ‘Why is there no bijection from C and D?’ Rather, it just
invites the response ‘You may have said enough to convince me that there is no
such function, but you haven’t given me an understanding of why this is so’. For
there seems to be some clear sense in which (E3) fails to isolate what it is about
C and D that is responsible for there being no such function. In contrast, (E1), and
(E2), do seem to yield genuine understandings of why there are no bijections
between the sets in question (as I have in effect noted). Thus, (E4) does not in fact
seem to be a genuine alternative to (E1), for it does not seem to be an explanation in
anything like the way in which (E1) is.
For the purposes of this paper it is enough that there is this intuitive difference
between (E1) and (E4), and so I will not try to give a precise account of what
underlies it. But I would suggest that this is something like the following: there is a
sense in which the middle fact of (E4)—i.e. this exhaustive description of the
totality of functions from C to D—already contains the information that we are
trying to explain, and so it cannot in any illuminating sense explain this information,
at least not in the way in which the middle fact of (E1) does.
6 The Finite Case
I will now consider the finite case of SIZE!FUNCTION, and how we know it. For we
are considering whether we know SIZE!FUNCTION, and so it is natural to consider
how we know this special case—assuming that we do—in the hope that we might be
know the general one in a similar way. More pointedly, as I noted in the last section,
what I said there about there being a sizeless explanation of the fact that there is no
bijection between N and PðNÞ would seem to apply just as well to any other pair of
sets of the form A and PðAÞ, including the case where A is finite. So one might
worry that I will be forced to deny that we know even the finite case of the principle.
In this section, however, we will see that we can give a straightforward argument for
this case, it is just that it will not extend to the general one.
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Specifically, we can establish the finite case of SIZE!FUNCTION using just the
following principles (together with something that one can prove in ZFC).
(6) For any sets X and Y, if X is finite and X is a proper subset of Y, then X is not
the same size as Y.
(7) For any finite sets X and Y, if there is a bijection from X to Y then X is the
same size as Y.
(8) hz is the same size as wi is an equivalence relation.
For ZFC proves that for any sets X and Y, either there is an injection from X to Y, or
vice versa. Thus, suppose that A and B are finite sets of the same size. And suppose
without loss of generality that there is an injection from A to B. That is, there is a
bijection from A to some E  B. If E = B then we are done. So suppose not. Then
by (6) E is not the same size as B. But by (7) A is the same size as E, which is
impossible: by (8) together with the hypothesis that A is the same size as B. So the
finite case of SIZE!FUNCTION holds.
But this argument cannot of course be extended to the general case: because (6) is
not true of infinite sets.
7 Basicness
So we find ourselves in the following situation: we have a widely accepted,
foundational principle that we seem unable to produce a convincing argument for.
(At least, the initially most promising strategies seem to fail. I will however
consider some more in Sect. 8.) In this sort of case, it is natural to wonder if the
principle in question might not be sufficiently obvious that we are entitled to treat it
as basic, i.e. believe it even in the absence of a supporting argument. After all, there
surely are mathematical claims that we are entitled to so treat (and for just this
reason): e.g. the axiom of extensionality in set theory, or the claim that 0 is not the
successor of any natural number. Why not SIZE!FUNCTION?
Well, just because it isn’t in fact obvious. This seems to emerge clearly from the
considerations of Sect. 5.2 in particular. For SIZE!FUNCTION states that whenever A
is the same size as B, there is a bijection between them. But we saw in Sect. 5 that in
the case of at least some pairs of infinite sets, the fact that there is no bijection
between them has an explanation that does not involve size. But then it is surely at
least prima facie possible that these are the only explanations for why there are no
such functions, i.e. that it is not also the case that the sets differ in size. Indeed, it is
prima facie possible that this is true of every pair of infinite sets without a bijection
between them. That is, that the only explanations of these facts are along the lines of
(E2), and the sets do not also differ in size. Of course, I am certainly not claiming to
have established that this is actually the case (I am not even claiming to have
established that N and PðNÞ are the same size). But it seems hard to maintain that
there is anything obviously wrong with this picture, and so hard to maintain that
SIZE!FUNCTION is obviously true.
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8 Inductive Arguments
In this section I will consider the possibility of giving an inductive argument for
SIZE!FUNCTION. That is, an argument based on the virtues of the results that it lets
us derive. For although some axioms of ZFC, for example, are sufficiently obvious
that we seem entitled to treat them as basic, there are others that we might seem
entitled to believe only on the basis of such an argument; most notably, the axiom of
replacement. What are the prospects of arguing for SIZE!FUNCTION in this way?
The initial obstacle is that—unlike the axiom of replacement—SIZE!FUNCTION
plays no role whatsoever in any proofs of mathematical results. It is of course crucial
to our understanding of the significance of many such results. But it can hardly be
argued for on the basis of the results that it lets us derive, for there are no such.
That leaves the option of an argument based on the non-mathematical, e.g.
philosophical, results that it allows us to derive. But what might these be? One initially
natural suggestion is this:18 the standard account of size (i.e. SIZE$FUNCTION together
with claims about when one set is smaller or larger than another) lets us use facts about
functions—which set theory has a wealth of—to derive facts about size. For example,
we know that for any sets A and B exactly one of the following holds: (i) there is an
injection fromA toB but not vice versa; (ii) there is a bijection fromA toB; or (iii) there
is an injection from B to A but not vice versa. Given the standard account of size, we
then get that exactly one of the following holds: (I) A is smaller than B; (II) A is the
same size asB; or (III) A is larger thanB. This is a nice result, and so onemight suggest
that it provides the basis for an inductive argument for the standard account (which of
course includes SIZE!FUNCTION).
The problem with this suggestion, however, is that although the standard account
does indeed allow us to derive this, that is also true of its most plausible alternative,
i.e. that on which all infinite sets are the same size. (It is easy to derive from this that
exactly one of (I–III) will always hold.) More generally, it is hard to see how
anything like this suggestion is going to succeed, given that the ‘one (infinite) size’
account would seem to yield a theory of size that is simpler and more powerful than
that yielded by the standard account: more powerful because while the standard
account leaves us with many questions about infinite size that we cannot answer,
even with the full force of ZFC (e.g. ‘Is there a size between those of N and
PðNÞ?’), the one size account allows us to answer all such questions. It seems
unlikely, then, that we are going to be able to establish SIZE!FUNCTION on the basis
of such an inductive argument.
9 ‘Size-Like’ Properties (Again)
Thus it appears that we are not in a position to know SIZE!FUNCTION. But what
about SIZE*!FUNCTION? In Sect. 4 I argued against the idea that this is just obvious.
But we are now in a position to say something stronger. For the above arguments
against the claim that we are in a position know SIZE!FUNCTION would seem to
18 Thanks here to Phillip Bricker and Jeremy Goodman.
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apply just as well to the weaker one that we are in a position to know
SIZE*!FUNCTION.
For example, we saw in Sect. 5 that in the paradigm cases of infinite sets without
bijections between them, we can explain this without appealing to size. But it is not
simply that the alternative explanation does not involve size—neither does it involve
any ‘size-like’ property, i.e. any property that is similar to size. For it is not as if we
replaced the claim that N and PðNÞ differ in size with one to the effect that they
differ in size*, for some such property size*. Rather, we replaced this claim with
DIAGONAL, which is of a completely different form, and which does not involve
anything like sizes.
Further, similar points can be made about each of the other arguments. We thus
seem no more in a position to know SIZE*!FUNCTION than we are to know
SIZE!FUNCTION.
10 Conclusion
I hope, then, to have made a plausible case to the effect that we are not in a position
to know SIZE!FUNCTION. In conclusion I will mention some directions that future
work on these issues might take.
The most obvious question that is raised—or reopened—by the above is of
course: are there, in fact, different sizes of infinity? How might one go about
investigating this? A natural strategy would seem to be to spend a bit more time
thinking about what sizes actually are, rather than focusing simply on a certain
criterion that we know tracks sameness of size in a range of cases.
But another, to a great extent independent, direction would add to the picture that
I sketched in Sect. 5.2. According to this, a number of claims about sets and
functions that one might have thought can only be explained in terms of size, can in
fact be explained in quite different ways. In particular, we looked at a number of
examples involving N and PðNÞ. But it is natural to ask how far these ideas can be
taken. What I said about N and PðNÞ would seem to extend straightforwardly
enough to other standard examples of sets that we know not to have bijections
between them. But can a similar claim be made about every pair of infinite sets
without such a function between them? What about other set-theoretic claims (i.e.
other claims expressible in the language of set theory)? Can each such truth be
explained in a way that does not involve differences in infinite size? It is natural to
ask about the relation of such questions to the Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorems. That
is, the relation between, on the one hand, explanations of set-theoretic claims that do
not involve differences in infinite size, and, on the other, models of such claims that
do not in fact contain such differences. These, then, are at least some of the
questions that I hope to pursue in future work.
Acknowledgements I would like to thank Mark Balaguer, Phillip Bricker, Michaela McSweeney,
Agustı´n Rayo, Marcus Rossberg, Ian Rumfitt, Joshua Schechter, audiences at the Oxford Philosophy of
Mathematics Conference and the Vancouver Summer Philosophy Conference, and two referees for this
journal.
B. Whittle
123
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s)
and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
References
Benacerraf, P. (1965). What numbers could not be. Philosophical Review, 74, 47–73.
Bolzano, B. (1851). Paradoxes of the infinite (D. A. Steele, 1950, Trans.). New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Go¨del, K. (1964). What is Cantor’s continuum problem? In S. Feferman et al. (Eds) Collected works:
Volume II, Publications 1938–1974 (1990, pp. 254–270). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hale, B., & Wright, C. (2001). The reason’s proper study: Essays towards a neo-Fregean philosophy of
mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hallett, M. (1984). Cantorian set theory and limitation of size. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mancosu, P. (2009). Measuring the size of infinite collections of natural numbers: Was Cantor’s theory of
the infinite inevitable? Review of Symbolic Logic, 2, 612–646.
Parker, M. (2009). Philosophical method and Galileo’s paradox of infinity. In B. van Kerkove (Ed.), New
perspectives on mathematical practices (pp. 76–113). Hackensack: World Scientific.
Rayo, A. (2013). The construction of logical space. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Whittle, B. (2015). On infinite size. In Oxford studies in metaphysics: Volume 9 (pp. 3–19). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wright, C. (1983). Frege’s conception of numbers as objects. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press.
Wright, C. (1997). On the philosophical significance of Frege’s theorem. In Hale and Wright (2001) (pp.
272–306).
Size and Function
123
